ABSTRACT. The problem of visual feature binding and the unity of an object in visual consciousness is discussed in relation to the account of these phenomena presented by interactive hierarchical structuralism. It is argued that the binding problem should be studied and solved from the intrinsic perspective, given by the information that is available within the system (i.e., brain) itself. This kind of information is always local. Therefore, the intrinsic perspective induces a process approach to solving the binding problem which depends on global information processed in different areas within the brain. The interaction between feedforward and feedback activity in the visual cortex is a process that solves the binding problem of visual features. A similar process could underlie visual awareness and the unity of an object in visual consciousness. It results in a sequential form of awareness, in which the awareness of one of the features of an object induces the awareness of its other features.
Visual feature binding concerns the question of how visual features of an object, like its shape, color, motion, and location, are bound to represent the same object, given that these features are processed in different brain areas. The question also pertains to the unity of visual consciousness, that is, the subjective awareness of an object as a unity instead of a collection of different features.
Interactive hierarchical structuralism (IHS), presented by LaRock (2007) , is an account of binding and the unity of visual cognition. IHS differs from 'tagging' theories like synchrony of activation, which assume that binding and the unity of (visual) consciousness occur when the activity of the neurons that process the different features of an object are marked by a common tag, such as the phase synchrony of their activity. Instead, IHS assumes that binding and unity emerge from the interaction between feedforward (lower-level) and feedback (higher-level) activity in the visual cortex.
In all, I agree with the analysis that tagging theories fail to account for binding (e.g., van der Velde & de Kamps, 2002) and that the interaction between feedforward and feedback activity in the visual cortex plays an important role in this respect (e.g., see van der Velde, 1997; ). However, IHS ignores an important reason why tagging theories fail to account for binding, and why the feedforward-feedback interaction is so important in this respect. As a consequence, IHS comes dangerously close to a homunculus account of binding when it is confronted with the binding problems within IHS itself.
The Intrinsic Perspective
To make my point, I begin with a short digression. When the famous mathematician Gauss studied the curvature of space, he came to realize that he was faced with a fundamental difficulty. We can see that the surface of a sphere is curved, but we do so because we see the sphere as a 3D object. Yet, its surface is a 2D space (e.g., it takes just two numbers to describe any position on earth). So, apparently, we use a space of a higher dimension to observe and study the properties of a given space (i.e., the curvature of the surface of a sphere). That works for a 2D space, but it is clear that this procedure does not work for our 3D space itself. Thus, Gauss came to realize that when we describe the curvature of the surface of a sphere, we take an extrinsic perspective, that is, we take an outside 3D look at a 2D space. But this perspective is not available for entities living on (and confined to) the 2D space itself (e.g., a 'society of ants'), as it is not available to us when we study the 3D space in which we live.
To solve this problem, Gauss developed the study of geometry from an intrinsic perspective, or intrinsic geometry for short (e.g., Misner, Thorne, & Wheeler, 1973) . In intrinsic geometry, the only information that can be used is information available within the space itself. So, the curvature of a 2D space like the surface of a sphere can be determined only by observations and measurements confined to the surface itself: for example, the observations and measurements that can be carried out by the 'society of ants' living on (or 'in') that space. Intrinsic geometry has had an important impact on geometry and physics because it allows the study of higher dimensional spaces, such as the 4D space-time of the General Theory of Relativity.
The main difference between the extrinsic and intrinsic perspective is the kind of information that is available. From a satellite, one can see half of the earth, which provides enough information to see that its surface is curved. But standing on earth, one cannot see beyond the horizon. Thus, from the intrinsic perspective, information is always local, not global. Therefore, as Gauss realized, the only way to obtain information about the global structure of a space in the intrinsic perspective is to carry out some kind of process. An example of such a process to obtain a measure of the intrinsic curvature of the 792 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 17 (6) surface of a sphere is the parallel transport of a vector around a closed loop. For example, transport a vector parallel to itself from the North Pole to the equator, then along the equator to the east, and then back to the North Pole again. The rotation of the returning vector in comparison to the original vector is a measure of the curvature of the surface enclosed by the loop (e.g., Misner et al., 1973) .
Feature Binding
The notion of intrinsic structure can be used for the feature binding problem as well. The reason why tagging theories of binding fail is because they provide a solution of the binding problem from the extrinsic perspective. An observation of synchrony of activation in different brain areas is an observation from an extrinsic (laboratory) perspective. This is clear not only from the fact that the observation itself is conducted in an extrinsic manner, but also from the global nature of the observation obtained. The entire brain can be observed within the extrinsic perspective, so it is possible to obtain global information about its structure and dynamics. But from the perspective of a neuron buried deep within the cortex, the situation is different. It has only an intrinsic perspective, which does not allow it to 'look beyond its horizon.' So, within the brain information is always local. To solve the binding problem, therefore, it has to be understood from an intrinsic perspective. When information about different features is processed in different brain areas, the binding of these features involves global information. As in the case of intrinsic geometry, solving a global information problem demands a process approach that goes beyond the local information obtainable within each of the different brain areas involved.
An example of such a process is the ability to answer binding questions (van der Velde & de Kamps, 2006) . For example, a correct answer to the question 'What is the color of this shape?' is dependent on the binding of color and shape of the object involved. Binding questions are also used to study binding experimentally. For example, a subject is shown a display of objects, consisting of unique colors and shapes. A shape or color (or location) is then given as a cue, and the subject has to report the other features of the object (e.g., de ). The question and answer, of course, do not have to be verbal. Instead, they could also consist of a behavioral task and response, such as moving the eyes to the location of a cued object (e.g., van der .
The fact that binding questions are used to study binding experimentally is not a coincidence. In an experiment, the system itself (i.e., the brain) has to produce the answer (in terms of the appropriate behavior), and the system itself is of course bound to the intrinsic perspective. So, it has to be queried experimentally in an intrinsic manner. The same should be the case for binding VAN DER VELDE: BINDING AND CONSCIOUSNESS 793 theories. Any binding theory should solve a binding problem (e.g., produce answers to binding questions) in an intrinsic manner.
In particular, a solution of the binding problem has to be a process that relies on intrinsic information whenever information processed in different areas is involved. This is certainly the case whenever the information is processed in a combinatorial or compositional manner (van der Velde & de Kamps, 2006) . Combinatorial processing entails that information is processed in terms of constituents (e.g., shape, color, motion and location in vision, or words and phrases in language) and the relations between these constituents. The benefit of compositional processing is its productivity, and its ability to process novel combinations of familiar constituents (e.g., new compositions of familiar visual features or new sentences of familiar words). This ability is a core ability of human cognition. But in terms of brain processing, it involves binding problems, because the constituent information is processed in different areas, sometimes widely distributed over the brain.
In the case of visual features, different features are processed in different brain areas or pathways in the visual cortex. The processing of these features is initially based on the (stimulus-driven, or bottom-up) feedforward activity that originates in the primary visual cortex (V1). In contrast, feedback activity is top-down (cue-driven), originating from selecting feature information in the features domains (e.g., color or shape identity). The interaction between feedforward and feedback activity in the visual cortex is indeed a process approach to solving the binding problem of visual features. For example, the question 'What is the color of this shape?' can be answered as follows. The visual features (shape, color, location) are first processed in their respective pathways. Within the shape pathway (domain), the cued shape is then selected. This initiates feedback activity that interacts with the feedforward activity in such a way that the other features of the cued object are selected as well (see .
A similar process should also be applied to the binding issue within IHS. The knowledge that a triangle is above a square instead of the other way around is also based on global information, when these features are processed in different brain areas (thus, when these relations are combinatorial). Therefore, a process-based solution for that problem should be found as well, binding above to triangle and/or below to square (see , for an example). Confronted with this problem, LaRock initially seems to take a processing approach when he refers to the interactions between V1 and the parietal cortex. But it seems that he is not quite aware of the reason why such an interaction is needed. Instead, he states that information is fed back to V1 'so that the cognitive subject could maintain the locale of an object' (p. 771). So, instead of a process answer to an intrinsic problem, we are suddenly confronted with a 'cognitive subject' that can maintain information about the location of an object when that information is fed back from the parietal cortex to V1. Not only does this not answer the question of how above is bound to triangle and/or below to 794 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 17(6) square, but it also introduces an unknown entity, the 'cognitive subject,' that seems to do the job instead. Ignoring the intrinsic perspective thus produces a seemingly homunculus account of binding in this case.
Unity of Consciousness
Can the notion of the intrinsic perspective be applied to the unity of consciousness as well? A direct consequence of the process approach to binding is that feature binding takes time. For example, once the shape is selected in the shape domain, the interaction between feedforward and feedback activity is first needed to select the color and location of the object. So, there is a time lag between the selection of the features. This time lag has been found experimentally as well (e.g., Schoenfeld et al., 2003) . But it appears to defy the notion of the unity of consciousness, because it seems that our awareness of an object's unity entails that we are conscious of its features simultaneously, not in sequence.
It should be noted that this is an introspective observation. Introspection was used as an experimental method in psychology, but became discredited because of its lack of objectivity. Yet, in the study of consciousness it seems hard to escape introspective observations. Indeed, introspection was chosen as a method because the aim was to study the content of consciousness. In this respect, it is interesting to note that feature binding has been the subject of introspective studies carried out by Külpe. In his history of experimental psychology, Boring (1950) gives an account of their outcome:
These experiments raised seriously the question as to whether all the attributes of a sensory impression are simultaneously present in consciousness, since the attentive predisposition for one may lead to a compete failure of introspection with regard to the others. (pp. 401-402) Apparently, carefully executed introspection of feature binding fails to corroborate the notion that an object's unity in consciousness entails the simultaneous awareness of its features. To put this in perspective, the process of feature binding, as outlined above, occurs in the order of a few hundred milliseconds. But this process suggests that awareness of the features is not truly simultaneous, but sequential with short time lags. This is not the same as small differences in onset latency between the identification of the features when they are initially processed. Instead, the process of feature binding, applied to awareness, suggests that awareness of the features of an object, and their unity in consciousness, is based on an (implicit) form of answering binding questions. That is, the awareness of an object's shape could raise the question of what its color would be, resulting in the process outlined above. The habit of raising these (implicit) questions and the short temporal lag of the answers could result in the notion of the unity of an object, which in turn could result in the idea of VAN DER VELDE: BINDING AND CONSCIOUSNESS the simultaneous awareness of its features. Yet, the introspection experiments of Külpe suggest a sequential nature of this process, in line with the intrinsic perspective on binding.
Conclusion
Visual feature binding and the unity of an object in consciousness have to be studied from the intrinsic perspective, which relies solely on the kind of information available within the system (i.e., the brain) itself. Interactive hierarchical structuralism presented by LaRock differs from tagging theories that describe feature binding from the extrinsic perspective. But IHS as yet ignores the reason why the interaction between feedforward and feedback activity is crucial in solving the binding problem. As a result, it fails to account for the binding problem within IHS itself.
The intrinsic perspective induces a process approach to the solution of the binding problem, because intrinsic information is always local. In the case of visual feature binding, such a process is provided by the interaction between feedforward activity and feedback activity in the visual cortex. A similar process could underlie visual awareness. In that case, the unity of an object in consciousness is not equivalent to simultaneous awareness of its features. Instead, it results in a sequential form of awareness, in which the awareness of one of the features of an object induces the awareness of its other features.
